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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles-Protection of the Accident Victim-Survey of
Financial Responsibility Laws
In the case of Reitz v. Mealey the United States Supreme Court
held constitutional the New York Automobile Financial Responsibility
Law.2 The Court held that the law, as amended in 19363 and in 1939,4
was neither a violation of the due process clause nor of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act.5 The New York Act represents the latest development
in the field of Financial Responsibility Laws. In addition to the usual
'Reitz v. Mealey, 62 S. Ct. 24, 86 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 8 (1941).
CONSoL. LAWS OF N. Y., c. 71, §94b.
'NEW YORK LAWS 1936, c. 448.
'NEW YORK LAWS 1939. c. 618.
142 STAT. 354 (1922); 11 U. S. C. A. 35 (1927).
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provision found in these laws for restoration of driver's license and
registration certificates (upon payment of judgment and proof of fi-
nancial responsibility) this act provided that upon written permission
of the unpaid judgment creditor, the debtor's license may be restored
for a period of six months without the necessity of first paying the
judgment. The act further provided that the clerk of court was under
a duty to certify an unpaid judgment only upon the written demand of
the judgment creditor or his attorney.
During recent years, because of the widespread use of the high-
ways, and the increased number of cars owned by those persons who
are not responsible financially, a major social problem has arisen in the
form of the uncompensated motor accident victim.6 Fortunately, so-
ciety has recognized this problem, and by various methods has attempted
to solve it. The judiciary of some nineteen states has met this-problem
in part by the adoption of the Family Purpose Doctrine.7 In other in-
stances the agency concept has been expanded (by statute as well as by
judicial decision) until in some jurisdictions the fact that one is driving
another's car gives rise to a presumption of agency.8 Massachusetts
has enacted the compulsory insurance law.9 Out of certain investiga-
tions carried on -by other legislatures has come the suggestion of an
automobile compensation plan patterned after the Workman's Compen-
sation Acts.10 Some thirty-four American jurisdictions have attempted
solution by enacting some form of a Financial Responsibility Law.
The first Financial Responsibility Law was enacted in Connecticut
in 1925, to go into effect in 1926.1" This act in its original form was
repealed in 193.1,12 and replaced by the present law of Connecticut. 13
Minnesota followed suit in 1927, and added the additional feature (now
found in practically all of the acts) of requiring proof of financial re-
sponsibility on conviction of certain violations of the motor vehicle
code. 14
A bare two years after these statutes began to operate, the American
Automobile Association began to sponsor this form of law. In 1928
the first draft of their model act ("The Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety
' Studies made in Connecticut show that in one year 62 per cent of those in-
jured temporarily and 72 per cent of those injured permanently received less
than their actual expenses as compensation. Of the amount which was received
14 per cent came from sources other than those responsible for the accident.
Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences (1936) 3 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 466.
" See, McCall, The Family Autonobile (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 256.8 Youfig v. Mosci, 289 U. S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599, 77 L. ed. 1158 (1933);
McCall, The Family Automobile (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 256.
93 ANN. LAWS OF MASS. (1930) c. 9, §34 (a-j).
" FRENCH, AUTOMOBILE COMPENSATION PLAN (1933).
" CoNN. LAWS 1925, c. 183. " CoNN. LAws 1931, c. 254.
11GEN. STAT. OF CONN. (1935 Supp.), §621 (c).
"LAWS OF MINN. 1927, c. 351, §§1-22.
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Responsibility Law") was presented. This act was revised in 1930,
again in 1932, and again in 1935.15 It has been adopted in some form
or variation in, at least twenty states. A draft of a law which was some-
what like that of the A.A.A., but which avoided some of its weaknesses,
was submitted in 1930 by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws.1' This act has been adopted by one state and
one territory. These organizations, along with other sponsors, have
been very energetic in their support of the Financial Responsibility
Laws, especially where the legislatures of the states were seriously con-
sidering either the Compulsory Insurance plan or the Automobile Com-
pensation plan. The cause for this energy can readily be seen when
the nature of the sponsors is examined closely. Most of them either
issue insurance on automobiles or have some close connection with in-
surance companies.
These Responsibility laws, though far from uniform, are all based
on the common plan of securing some proof of financial responsibility
from those motorists who have shown themselves most likely to produce
damages. Generally these laws provide that upon conviction of certain
enumerated violations of the motor vehicle code and/or proof of an
unsatisfied judgment stemming from an automobile accident, the com-
missioner of vehicles is to suspend the driver's license of the person so
involved, and, if that person owns the car, to take his registration papers
away. This suspension or revocation can only be lifted when the person
convicted furnishes proof in the specified manner (by presentation of
an insurance policy, a surety bond, or certain securities) that he will be
responsible for damages done in the future. Usually this proof must
be maintained for a specified period, at the end of which, if the person's
driving record is satisfactory, the proof will no longer be required.
Most of the states provide that if the person suffering such a judgment
or conviction is a chauffeur, the owner of the auto may furnish the re-
quired proof, and license will be issued to the chauffeur on the condition
that he may drive his employer's car only.
Many states make payment of the unsatisfied judgment, as well as
proof of financial responsibility, a condition precedent to restoration.
Where such is the case there is a uniform provision that credit of cer-
tain amounts on judgments for large sums will be considered payment,
and that, with the court's permission, payment may be by installments.
Other provisions are to the effect that a discharge in bankruptcy is
not payment. The Supreme Court, in upholding this provision, said in
the Reitz case: "The penalty which [the statute] imposes for injury
due to careless driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely,
'SNote (1937) 12 Wxs. L. REv. 96. 10 Note (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rzv. 96.
[Vol, 20
NOTES AND COMMENTS
but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not, with
impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of the legis-
lation would be frustrated if the reckless drivers were permitted to
escape its provisions by the simple expedient of ordinary bankruptcy,
and, accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy
should not interfere with the operation of the statute."17
In support of the Financial Responsibility Laws, many writers have
compared their results with those derived from the compulsory insur-
ance plan.' s Financial Responsibility Laws are said to have produced
the following results: (1) promoted careful driving (carelessness im-
poses the necessity of proving responsibility) ; (2) segregated the care-
less motorist; (3) promoted voluntary insurance; (4) promoted an
increase in voluntary settlements out of court; (5) they are consistent
with sound underwriting principles (undesirable risks are not forced
on the carriers) ; and (6) they do not impose a burden on the careful
motorist. In connection with the compulsory insurance plan, these
writers say that the following undesirable results are produced: (1)
carelessness is sponsored by removal of fear of loss; (2) insurance
rates are caused to skyrocket; (3) exaggerated claims are induced; (4)
juries are influenced in favor of the plaintiff; (5) such compulsory in-
surance is one of the manifestations of the rising tide of socialism; (6)
the innocent motorist is unduly burdened; (7) the poor man is driven
off the road; (8) automobile and accessory business is adversely affect-
ed; (9) and it has proved unsatisfactory in Massachusetts.
Although all of these arguments are either not borne out by the
record or are answerable, the courts generally have favored these laws.
They have almost unanimously been held to be constitutional," and
the courts have been very sympathetic in attempting to effectuate the
purpose of these laws in construing them.2 0
These statutes fall quite naturally into four broad categories, with
variations in each category.2 1 In Class I proof of financial responsibility
must be furnished, and the unsatisfied judgment paid; proof must also
be furnished in consequence of certain violations of the motor vehicle
code. Twenty-one states, one territory, and the District of Columbia,
" Reitz v. Mealey, 62 S. Ct. 24, 27, 86 L. ed. 8, 11 (1941). But see, In Re
Perkins, 3 F. Supp. 697 (N.D.N.Y. 1933); In Re Hicks, 133 F. 739 (N.D.N.Y.
1905).8Note (1931) 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. 126, 132.
"Hedge Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335, 52 S. Ct. 144, 76 L. ed. 323 (1931);
Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. ed. 833 (1928) ; Packard
v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 S; Ct. 257, 68 L. ed. 596 (1924) ; Munz v. Harnett,
6 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Watson v. State Division of Motor Vehicles,
212 Cal. 279, 298 Pac. 481 (1931); In Re Opinion of Justices, (Mass.) 147 N. E.
680, 681 (1925).20Walashin v. Century Indemnity Co., 116 N. J. L. 577, 186 Atl. 45 (1936).:'.Note (1937) 12 Wis. L. REv. 96.
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have adopted laws which fall into this class. They are: Arizona,22
California,23 Colorado, 24 Delaware,2 5 District of Columbia,
26 Hawaii,27
Kansas, 28 Kentucky,29 Idaho,30 Illinois,31 Indiana,3 2 Maryland,83 Mich-
igan,34 Montana,3 5 Nebraska,3 6 New Hampshire,37 New Jersey,88 New
York,39 North Carolina,40 Oregon,41 Pennsylvania,4 2 Washington,43
West Virginia,44 and Wisconsin. 45
As shown in the Reitz case, New York varies somewhat from the
usual pattern by providing that the judgment creditor may cause the
suspension to be lifted by giving his permission, and that the clerk of
court is under a duty to certify an unsatisfied judgment only when the
judgment creditor so demands. These provisions constitute added in-
ducements to the debtor to satisfy the existing judgment; but in so pro-
viding these inducements, the legislature has robbed the statute, to a
large extent, of its power to secure financially responsible drivers in
the future.
The Kansas statute provides that when a judgment remains unsatis-
fied for three years, and the judgment debtor shows that he is unable to
pay it or to produce evidence of financial responsibility, his license and
registration certificates shall be restored. Such a provision is unfor-
tunate in that it will return to the highway those motorists who have
demonstrated that they are absolutely financially irresponsible.
The District of Columbia and Montana provide that a discharge in
bankruptcy will constitute payment.
New Hampshire requires that the commissioner shall suspend the
license of any motorist involved in an accident which causes more than
$25 damage. The suspension is to continue until the person has re-
2 CODE OF ARIZ. (1939) §§66-248.
" VEHICLE CODE OF CAL. (1937) §§410-418.
" COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 16, §§39-75.
"REv. CODE OF DEL. (1935) §§5705-12.
26 D. C. CODE (1939) tit. 6, §255 (a-o).
RF' v. LAWS OF HAWAII (1935) §§2680-2706.
GEN. STAT. OF KAN. (1939 Supp.) §§8-701 to 8-721.
CARROLL'S Ky. STAT. (B.ldwin, 1936 Revision) §§2739nl-36.
30 IDAHo SEss. LAWS 1939, c. 117.
3' ANN. ILL. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1938) c. 95, §38 (B-K).
2 IND. Acrs 1939, c. 73.
" ANN. CODE OF MD. (1939) Art. 56, §§165-181.
4 MIcH. STAT. ANN. (1933) §§9.1541-47.
"MONT. SFss. LAWS 1937, c. 129; 1939, c. 89.
'
0 NEB. CONSOL. STAT. (1939 Supp.) §§60-601 to 60-624.
"N. H. LAWS 1937, c. 161; 1939, c. 49.
2539 N. J. STAT. ANN. (1931) §§6-2 to 6-22.
CoNsoL. LAWS OF N. Y. (1941) c. 71.
'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2621 (112-126).
428 ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. (1940) §§115-401 to 115-437.
"STAT. OF PA. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) §1253.
"LAWS OF WASH. 1939, c. 158.
"W. VA. CODE (1937) §1721 (1-19).
45WIs. STAT. (1937) §85.08.
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ceived a release or a judgment in his favor, or has satisfied an adverse
judgment, and, in either case, filed proof of financial responsibility. If
the injured or aggrieved party has not brought suit within one year the
statute allows the commissioner to issue such persons new licenses.
Pennsylvania provides that proof must be furnished by a driver
who has had two or more accidents in any twelve-month period and
has not as yet settled therefor.
Indiana provides that proof of responsibility must be maintained
only one year in the case of first offenders and three years for multiple
offenders.
North Carolina, probably out of an excess fear for the constitu-
tionality of the statute, provides that if the offender is a resident of the
state his license may be restored on payment of the judgment or presen-
tation of proof of responsibility. However, in the case of non-residents
the provision is that there must be payment and proof. This would
seem to raise a constitutional question of discrimination. 46
Statutes in Class II make no requirement that the unsatisfied judg-
ment be paid, but provide that if the judgment debtor files proof of
responsibility he may continue to operate his vehicle. Minnesota, 47
Ohio,48 Vermont,40 and Virginia50 have adopted this type of statute.
Statutes in Class III provide only for payment of the unsatisfied
judgment. Iowa,51 Maine,5 2 South Dakota,53 and Virginia54 have enact-
ed laws of this type.
Virginia is listed in both Class II and III since, while it provides
primarily for payment of the judgment, if after a year the commissioner
feels that the debtor has made a bona fide effort to pay, he may issue
license upon presentation of proof of responsibility.
Class IV deals with offenders against the motor vehicle code only.
Here there is no mention of unsatisfied judgment. Connecticut,55
Rhode Island,56 and North Dakota57 have enacted laws of this type.
Connecticut requires proof of financial responsibility of anyone who
is shown to be responsible for an accident resulting in death.
To evaluate these statutes the results attained by them must be
weighed against the results expected of them. It is claimed that these
" See, Legislation (1930) 9 N. C. L. Rsv. 384.
'" LAws OF MINN. 1933, c. 351, §§1-22.
4" OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1935) §6298-1.
SPuB. LAws OF VER. 1933, §§5190 to 5199.
"oVA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §2154 (204-8).
81 CODE OF IOWA (1939) §§5021.01, et. seq.REv. STAT. OF Mo. (1930) c. 29, §§91 to 98.
' CODE OF S. D. (1939) §44.0504.
' VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §2154 (204-8).
GEN. STAT. OF CONN. (Supp. 1931, 33, 35) §621c.
" GEN. LAWS OF R. I. (1932) c. 98, §§1-17.
"ILAWS OF N. D. 1939, c. 167.
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laws will segregate the bad driver from the good, but obviously they
will not be as effective as a well-administered license lawY8 Under
the present statutes a thoroughly irresponsible driver may furnish proof
of his ability to respond in damages and be allowed to drive, whereas
a competent driver might be unable to furnish such proof. Thus, the
failure to achieve segregation becomes apparent.
Everyday observation shows the invalidity of the claim that these
laws will prevent or decrease automobile accidents.59 "The argument
is that the fewer bad drivers on the road the fewer accidents we have.
Unfortunately the accident rate in the various states seems to have
little or no relation to the number of revocations or suspensions. The
question is whether the responsibility laws, independent of revocation,
decrease accidents. The answer is obvious when it is seen that proof
of financial responsibility nullifies many suspensions and revocations."60
It is claimed that these laws compel the known bad driver to insure;
but this cannot be, for the class that is intended to be reached is by far
too small to include the known bad drivers. This class is not effectively
reached. Only the bad driver is aimed at, but before this class can be
segregated they must be allowed to show their propensities-they must
be allowed to have their "first bite". Conceding that after these tenden-
"Feinsinger, Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws (1936), 3 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 519, 522.
" Over two per cent (30,114) of all the deaths (1,381,491) in the United
States in 1938 were caused by auto accidents. VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNIMas
STATES (1938) Part II, Table 6, p. 93. AUTO FACTS AND FiGURsS (1924-36), a
publication of the Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., gives the fol-
lowing table as indicative of the steady increase in traffic accidents:
Number of Fatalities
Per 100,000 Autos
Year Registered
1917 .................................................. 178
1918 .................................................. 154
1919 .................................................. 130
1920 .................................................. 119
1921 .................................................. 118
1922 .................................................. 112
1923 .................................................. 109
1924 .................................................. 100
1925 .................................................. 100
1926 .................................................. 105.9
1927 .................................................. 110.9
1928 .................................................. 111.8
1929 .................................................. 117.3
1930 .................................................. 122.5
1931 .................................................. 129.8
1932 .................................................. 121.6
1933 .................................................. 132
1934 .................................................. 145
In connection with the contention in the body of the note, it is interesting to
observe that the first consistent climb in the accident rate began in the year
(1926) in which the first financial responsibility law went into effect.
00 Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws (1936), 3 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 519. 523.
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cies have been shown the class is indicated, a conviction or final judg-
ment must be had before proof of financial responsibility is required.6 '
It is believed that the Financial Responsibility Laws are not very
effective 'in securing the payment of past judgments. In many states
the judgment must be above a certain minimum amount to come within
the statute. Statistics show that the actual number of cases where proof
is required after judgment is very small.6
It is claimed that Financial Responsibility Laws increase the pro-
portion of insured cars and drivers. Conceding this to be so, would not
this result follow from any law which publicized the desirability of in-
surance .13
The desirability of these laws-to some people, at least-is attested
by the fact that they have enjoyed such widespread and continuous
popularity; but as one surveys the field the conclusion is almost inevi-
table that the chief attainment of these laws has been to serve as a seda-
tive for those who should have the solution of the problem of the uncom-
pensated motor accident most at heart. Little, if anything, has been
solved by these laws. It would certainly be to the interest of society
to discard such laws and find a more satisfactory means of assuring the
victim of a motor vehicle accident, of satisfactory compensation.
FRED R. EDNEY.
Contracts-Gratuitous Service-Rebutting Evidence -
Pleading-Recovery on Quantum Meruit When Express
Contract Pleaded
In Graham v. Hoke,' P alleged that for several years prior to dece-
dent's death, she had worked for decedent, at his request, both in his
house and in his store; that she was not receiving any weekly pay, but
"was treated as a member of (decedent's) family", decedent informing
her that she would be taken care of at his death and "giving her [a]
11 The weakness of the requirement that a conviction or a final judgment must
be obtained before proof of financial responsibility is required lies in the fact
that (a) a conviction may be reversed, may never be recorded, or may possibly
in other ways escape the attention of the commissioner of vehicles; and (b)
that judgment may never be taken, the action may be compromised, the injured
person may never sue, judgment may be set aside or vacated, or it may not ex-
ceed the amount required by statute as a condition precedent to requiring proof
of ability to respond in damages. Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Re-
sponsibility Laws (1936), 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 519, 524.62 Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws (1936), 3 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 519, 528. In Connecticut in 1930, financial responsibility laws
caused payment of 18 claims out of 88 complaints and 13,585 cases of personal
injury and property damage. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION
FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RE-
SEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1930), p. 102.
62 Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws (1936), 3 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 519, 529.
1219 N. C. 755, 14 S. E. (2d) 790 (1941).
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contract ... as evidence of his promises and intentions." The alleged
"written agreement" was in the form of a check, payable to plaintiff at
the death of the drawer, decedent. The lower court overruled a de-
murrer to the complaint by decedent's administratrix, but this was re-
versed on appeal. The Supreme Court, without citing authority, gave
the following reasons for reversal: (1) The check was invalid as a
written contract; (2) Since "It is specifically alleged that plaintiff was
a member (italics supplied) of the family" she was "presumed to have
rendered the alleged services gratuitously, and in the absence of a valid
special contract that she was to be paid therefor there is no cause of ac-
tion alleged"; and (3) Since plaintiff declared only on a "written agree-
ment" as a special contract, she is not entitled to a recovery on quantum
meruit.2
Since the death of the drawer terminates the authority of the bank
to pay,3 it may be assumed and granted that the check was invalid as a
check. Still, if there was consideration for the check,4 the drawer
' The court said further that plaintiff "may have pleaded an implied contract
as well as a special contract in the alternative, but when the case came on for
trial she could have been compelled to elect upon which declaration she would
proceed." Even this requirement of an election is doubtful under the past
liberality of North Carolina procedure [MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE
AND PROCEDmE (1929) 377, 420], but assuming this to be the correct rule, it
seems to be no reason for sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.
'Guild v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 122 Me. 514, 121 Atl. 13 (1923);
Zane, Death of the Drawer of a Check (1904) 17 HARv. L. R. 104; OGDEN,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4th. ed, 1938) 462; Note (1913) 43 L.R.A. (N.S.)
109; 7 Am. JuR. 440 (Banks §606).
'Foxworthy v. Adams, 136 Ky. 403, 124 S. W. 381 (1910); Keeler v. Hiles'
Estate, 103 Neb. 465, 172 N. W. 363 (1919) ; Zane, mrpra note 3, at 106.
It is generally conceded today that the payee of a check given to him, either
inter viros or causa mortis, without consideration, cannot enforce payment of
the same. [Brissler v. Russell, 197 Ia. 166, 197 N. W. 22 (1924) ; Guild v.
Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 122 Me. 514, 121 Atl. 13 (1923); Notes (1922)
20 A. L. R. 177, (1926) 44 A. L. R. 625, (1928) 53 A. L. R. 1119.] Prior to
the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, there was some con-
flict of authority on this point. The minority of the courts held that such a gift
was valid and that payment of the check could be enforced, reasoning that the
check operated as an assignment of that amount of money from the maker's
bank account; the check thus being an executed gift, with only performance de-
layed. The majority denied this rule, holding that a check was not an assign-
ment of specific funds, therefore payment could not be enforced for there was
no consideration for the maker's .promise to pay. The Uniform Negotiable In-
struments Law adopted the latter view [N. I. L. §189; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1939)
§3171; Note (1913) 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 109; 7 Amt. JUR. 383 (Banks §532)],
resolving the conflict of decisions.
In defendant's appellate brief, much consideration was given to the definition
of the word "give" contained in the complaint. This was not discussed in the
report of the case, but it seems worthwhile to mention this in connection with
the consideration question. Plaintiff alleged that decedent informed her that
"she would be taken care of at his death and giving (italics supplied) her the
contract" as evidence of his promises. Defendant contended that this was
equivalent to admitting that the check was without consideration. It is true that
the technical definition of the word "give" implies a gratuity, but it is a matter of
common knowledge that it is used popularly in the sense of transferring, deliver-
ing, or handing over. [Crawford v. Hurst, 307 Ill. 243, 138 N. E. 620 (1923) ; 3
WORDS AND PHRASES (5th ed.) 27; WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
[Vol. 20
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would be liable thereon, or for that amount, for the check implies a
binding obligation to pay on the part of the drawer,5 or in case of his
death on the part of his executor or administrator.6  Numerous cases
hold that a check is a sufficient memorandum of an oral agreement upon
which liability may be based ;7 in fact, there is some authority for the
position that a check itself is a special contract. 8  It is submitted that
the court could well have upheld this purported check as the basis for
contractual liability, regardless of its validity or invalidity as a check
after the drawer's death.
On the second point, supra, the pleadings show that plaintiff did not
allege that she "was a member of the family" of decedent; she alleged
that she "was treated as a member" of his family. The rule of law on
which the court based this portion of its decision is that when services
are rendered by one member of a family to another member thereof,
such services are presumed to be gratuitous.9 The problem as to who
are members of the family within this rule has been the subject of
much discussion, some courts going so far as to hold that all members
of the household, including servants, are members of the family.' 0
Conversely, it has been held that only the relation of parent and child in
the same home, will call for the application of this presumption. 1 As
recently as 1938 the North Carolina Court has said that the fact of
(2nd Unabridged Edition, 1940).] It seems that this was the sense in which the
word was used in the complaint, and though unwisely used, it should not be con-
strued technically against the plaintiff; and indeed the report does not indicate that
it was.
By making and delivering the check, the drawer implies that he is paying a
valid obligation, and that he intends to be bound thereby. Guild v. Eastern Trust
and Banking Co., 122 Me. 514, 12.1 Atl. 13 (1923) ; Baxter v. Brandenburg, 136
Minn. 411, 163 N. W. 516 (1917). See N. I. L. §61, N. C. CODE (Michie, 1939)
§3042.
' Baxter v. Brandenburg, 136 Minn. 411, 163 N. W. 516 (1917); 21 Ali.
JUR. 567 (Ex. & Adm. §327).
" Harper v. Battle, 180 N. C. 375, 104 S. E. 658 (1920) ; Neaves v. No. State
Mining Co., 90 N. C. 412 (1884) ; Patterson v. Chapman, 179 Cal. 203, 176 Pac.
37, 2 A. L. R. 1467 and Note (1918).
'Guild v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 122 Me. 514, 121 At. 13 (1923).
See Patterson v. Chapman, 179 Cal. 203, 176 Pac. 37 (1918); Jenkins v. Sullivan,
110 Md. 539, 73 Atl. 264 (1909).
0 Brown v. Williams, 196 N. C. 247, 145 S. E. 233 (1928); Winkler v. Killian,
141 N. C. 575, 54 S. E. 540 (1906) ; Young v. Herman, 97 N. C. 280, 1 S. E.
792 (1887) ; Dodson v. McAdams, 96 N. C. 149, 2 S. E. 453 (1887) ; 'Hudson v.
Lutz, 50 N. C. 217 (1857) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1936) §91A; 1 MORDECAI,
LAW LEcTuREs (2nd ed., 1916) 113, 115; Note (1908) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873.
But see, Hauser v. Sain, 74 N. C. 552 (1876) ; Barror v. Cain, 216 N. C. 282,
4 S. E. (2d) 618 (1939) making no mention of a presumption in allowing a re-
covery by plaintiff against his grand-uncle, for services rendered after defendant
induced plaintiff to live with him during his life.
'0 Krukowski v. Paluszewski's Estate, 240 Mich. 291, 215 N. W. 358 (1927);
Note (1908) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873; WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL Diction-
ARY (2nd Unabridged Edition, 1940). But see, Ellis v. Davis, 90 Ky. 183, 14 S. W.
74 (1890).
" Gerz v. Weber, 162 Pa. 530, 29 Atl. 761 (1894).
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"family unity" alone would not give rise to the presumption of gratui-
tous services ;12 that "there must also be a certain relationship' between
the parties from which it may be supposed the services were referable
to some moral or legal duty which the servitor recognizes as impell-
ing."' 3 While the presumption can apply even though the parties are
of no blood relationship,' 4 it seems clear that there need be some duty
or obligation on the part of the servitor to render the services.', In the
principal case, no such duty or obligation was shown on the part of the
plaintiff. Rather, the facts indicate that decedent had merely hired
plaintiff as housekeeper, payment for her services being postponed until
the death of the employer. Since there was no impelling "moral or legal
duty" on' the plaintiff to render these services, it is submitted that the
presumption of gratuitous services should not have been applied.
Assuming, however, that the presumption was properly applied, it
seems clear that the allegations of the complaint present sufficient facts
from which the jury would be entitled to find that the presumption was
rebutted. The court holds that without an allegation of a valid special
,contract showing that plaintiff was to be paid for her services, no cause
of action is alleged. Many previous North Carolina cases have held
that all the facts and circumstances are to be considered by the jury in
determining whether or not the presumption has been overcome, 1 im-
plying that no special contract is required. Here, the implied obliga-
tion assumed by the drawer in giving plaintiff the check, albeit invalid,
seems to be the best evidence that the services were not to be rendered
gratuitously. Also, plaintiff alleged that deceased informed her that
"she would be taken care of at his death." Further, a check in itself
implies that it was given for a consideration.' 7 These allegations, if
believed, would clearly justify the jury in finding that there was an
agreement between the parties that the services were not to be rendered
gratuitously, and in the light of the earlier cases, if such an agreement
is found, the presumption, if applied at all, would be rebutted, entitling
plaintiff to a recovery on quantum meruit. Therefore, it seems clear
that plaintiff has stated a good cause of action by showing the rendition
' Landreth v. Morris, 214 N. C. 619, 200 S. E. 378 (1938).
" Id. at 624, 200 S. E. at 381.
"' Winkler v. Killian, 141 N. C. 575, 54 S. E. 540 (1906) ; Krug v. Mills,
159 Md. 670, 152 At. 493 (1930); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1936) §91A; Note
(1908) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873, 887. See Callahan v. Wood, 118 N. C. 752, 24
S. E. 542 (1896).
"Landreth v. Morris, 214 N. C. 619, 200 S. E. 378 (1938); Sutch's Estate,
201 Pa. 305, 50 Atl. 943 (1902).
" Keiger v. Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 733, 178 S. E. 666 (1935) ; Wood v. Wood,
186 N. C. 559, 120 S. E. 194 (1923); Debruhl v. Trust Co., 172 N. C. 839, 90
- S. E. 9 (1916); Winkler v. Killian, 141 N. C. 575, 54 S. E. 540 (1906); Dodson
v. McAdams, 96 N. C. 149, 2 S. E. 453 (1887); Williams v. Barnes, 14 N. C.
348 (1832). " See supra note 5.
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of the services and evidence that they were not being rendered gratui-
tously; thus, defendant's demurrer should have been overruled, allowing
the case to go to the jury on the question of whether or not the pre-
sumption had in fact been rebutted by the conduct of the parties.
The court held that since plaintiff alleged the special contract only,
and had not declared on an implied contract, she was not entitled to a
recovery on quantum reruit. Since the case of Jones v. Mial8 in 1880,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina has consistently held that "The
judgment where there is an answer, may be for any relief consistent
with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue....
It is the apparent purpose of the new system [the Code of Civil Proce-
dure] ... to afford any relief to which a plaintiff may be entitled upon
the facts set out in his complaint, although misconceived and not spe-
cially demanded in his prayer . . . [When] the essential facts are con-
tained in the pleadings, and whether the remedy is on the.special con-
tract or on what are called the common counts, it ought not be denied." '19
Since it has been shown that plaintiff here clearly had a cause of action
in quantum meruit for the value of the services rendered decedent (by
alleging the rendition of those services plus facts from which the jury
c6uld find that the presumption of gratuity had been rebutted), it seems
that the demurrer to the complaint should have been overruled, for "A
complaint will be sustained against a demurrer ... if any parts present
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or if facts sufficient for
that purpose can be gathered from it under a liberal construction of its
terms . . . a complaint will not be overthrown by demurrer unless it is
wholly insufficient-that is, if from all its parts we can see that there is
a cause of action and sufficient ground for relief in law or equity.
20
Numerous cases in North Carolina previously have held that a plain-
tiff's failure to prove an alleged special contract does not preclude re-
covery on quantun mieruit for services shown to have been rendered.
21
1182 N. C. 252, adopting opinion of Smith, C. J., dissenting on previous hear-
ing in 79 N. C. 164 at 167. In this case plaintiff presented his evidence and
failed to prove the alleged special contract, and the trial court ruled that his
complaint did not permit evidence to be offered as to the quantum merult value
of his services, and nonsuited him. This was affirmed in 79 N. C. 164, but on
rehearing in 82 N. C. 252, the trial court and the former decision were reversed.
"Jones v. Mial, 79 N. C. 164, 167 (1878). Dissenting opinion adopted on
rehearing in Jones v. Mial, 82 N. C. 252 (1880).2 Hartsfield v. Bryan, 177 N. C. 166, 168, 98 S. E. 379, 380 (1919). See,
Sexton v. Farrington, 185 N. C. 339, 117 S. E. 172 (1923) ; Conrad v. Board of
Education, 190 N. C. 389, 130 S. E. "53 (1925).
2"Wittkowski v. Harris (C. C., W. D. N. C., 1894) 64 Fed. 712; Lipe v.
Trust Co., 206 N. C. 24, 173 S. E. 316 (1934); Edwards v. Matthews, 196 N. C.
39, 144 S. E. 368 (1928) ; Dorsey v. Corbett, 190 N. C. 783, 130 S. E. 842 (1925) ;
Wood v. Wood, 186 N. C. 559, 120 S. E. 194 (1923) ; Debruhl v. Trust Co., 172
N. C. 839, 90 S. E. 9 (1916) ; Blackmore v. Winders, 144 N. C. 212, 56 S. E.
874 (1907) ; Wright v. Insurance Co., 138 N. C. 488, 51 S. E. 55 (1905) ; Burton
v. Mfg. Co., 132 N. C. 17, 43 S. E. 480 (1903); Sams v. Price, 119 N. C. 572,
26 S. E. 170 (1896); Roberts v. Woodworking Co., 111 N. C. 432, 16 S. E. 415
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It is submitted that the trial court was correct in overruling the de-
murrer to the complaint in the principal case, for even assuming that
the check was invalid as the alleged special contract, there were facts
alleged which would entitle the jury to find that the presumption of
gratuitous services had been rebutted, and the pleadings were sufficient
to allow a recovery on quantum meruit.
P. DALTON KENNEDY, JR.
Injunction Against Burdensome Suit Instituted Under
Federal Employer's Liability Act
Section 56 of the Federal Employer's Liability Act' authorizes prose-
cution of personal injury actions arising thereunder in the United States
District Court in any one of the following places: (1) The district
of the residence of the railroad (the district in which the railroad has
its domicile and principal office), (2) the district in which the accident
occurred, or (3) any district in which the railroad shall be doing busi-
ness at the time such action is initiated. The same section provides
that state courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts
in suits instituted under the Act.
Employee, a resident of Ohio, filed suit in Federal District Court of
New York against employer railroad, which was doing business in that
district, for personal injuries sustained in Ohio while engaged in the
service of the railroad. Thereafter, defendant railroad instituted suit
in an Ohio state court to enjoin employee from proceeding in the for-
eign federal court on the ground that courts were available to employee
in his resident district, and that no substantial benefit would be gained
by employee through the foreign suit. The petition further showed that
such foreign suit subjected the railroad to unnecessary additional ex-
pense, inconvenience and oppression in that the forum selected was 700
miles from the residence of the plaintiff and from the residence of nu-
merous witnesses for the railroad. Held: A state court cannot en-
join a resident from prosecuting an action under the Federal Employ-
er's Liability Act in a federal court of another state which is given
jurisdiction by the Act. This was held to be true even though courts
were available locally and suit in the foreign federal court might cause
great inconvenience .and expense to the defendant without resulting in
any substantial benefit to the employee.2
(1892); Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C. 601, 13 S. E. 92 (1891); Stokes v. Taylor,
104 N. C. 394, 10 S. E. 566 (1889); Lewis v. RR, 95 N. C. 179 (1886); Mc-
INTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) 377; 1 MORDECAI,
LAW LECTURES (2nd. ed., 1916) 127.
'36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. A. §§51-59 (1928).
'Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 62 S. Ct. 6, 86 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 37
(1941) (Stone, C. J., Roberts and Frankfurter, J. J., dissenting) Aff'g 137 Ohio
St. 206, 409, 28 N. E. (2d) 982 (1940).
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The history of the Federal Employer's Liability Act shows that
Congress has from time to time enlarged the rights and privileges of
the employee.3 The original act neither designated courts (state or fed-
eral) in which action might be brought nor attempted to establish venue.4
Under the second act venue of actions was left to the general venue
statute,5 which fixed venue of suits in federal courts in the resident dis-
trict of the railroad. This contained no reference to actions instituted
in state courts. This compelled the injured employee to bear the ex-
pense and inconvenience of seeking the railroad's domicile and trans-
porting witnesses and evidence there. Such a result prompted the
enactment of the present liberal statute permitting the injured employee
to select his forum in any one of the three listed places. The net re-
sult of the whole development, as the principal case illustrates, can well
be to shift the burden of expense, vexation, and inconvenience from the
injured employee under the former act to the railroad under the present
act.
Under the present act, prior to the immediate decision, an important
distinction had been made between suits instituted in foreign state and
foreign federal courts. State courts of equity, upon application of the
railroad, have been willing to restrain injured employees from institut-
ing proceedings in a foreign state court where such actions would sub-
ject defendants to inconveniences, hardships, and increased expenses.
Injunctions have been granted where (1) one of the purposes of the
foreign action was to secure some unfair advantage arising under the
law of the foreign state ;6 (2) an undue burden on interstate commerce
resulted (removing employees, as witnesses, from their work to the
trial in some distant state causing an interruption in the operating facili-
ties of the railroad) ;7 (3) the distant action caused inconvenience to
'Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 137 Ohio St. 409, 414, 30 N. E. (2d)
982, 984. While the doctrine of comparative negligence is adopted in both the
original and present acts, the latter act provides that where the carrier has vio-
lated the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A. §1, it cannot allege the contributory
negligence of the employee as a defense to employee's suit.
'34 STAT. 232 (1906) (the employee had one year in which to bring his ac-
tion).
35 STAT. 65 (1908) (the statute of limitations was extended from one to
two years). Also see Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 173 Fed. 527 (CC
5th, 1909) (where jurisdiction is in federal court of defendant's residence).
Reed's Adm'x. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794
(1918). (Cause of action arose in Kentucky and suit instituted in Minnesota
state court. Because Minnesota law permits a verdict by 10 of 12 jurors, courts
of this state had become popular for damage suits against railroads. An action
was instituted in state court of Kentucky to enjoin the Minnesota proceedings.
Held: Injunction granted.)
7 Kern v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446
(1933). (Accident in Indiana, suit instituted in state court of Missouri neces-
sitating removal of 25 witnesses from their regular work in Indiana to scene of
trial, thereby burdening and delaying interstate commerce and causing unreason-
able expense to railroad. State court of Indiana granted injunction against
Missouri proceedings.)
1942]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
witnesses ;8 (4) and where fraud was likely to be practiced upon the
foreign state court.9 These decisions accord with the more general
practice of equity courts of restraining out of state litigation on causes
of action arising within the state, where the foreign suit would impose
an unreasonable and inequitable burden upon the petitioning party.10
As to the power of a federal court to enjoin suits under the Act insti-
tuted in foreign state courts, no decisions have been discovered. Ap-
parently a federal court could not enjoin actions in a foreign state court
because of the statute prohibiting federal injunctions against state court
proceedings.1"
Where the railroad institutes action in a state or federal court to
enjoin the injured employee's suit in a foreign federal court, injunction
has been denied even though continuance of such suit in the foreign
forum may result in hardship and increased expense to the defendant ;12
inconvenience to witnesses;13 promotion of excessive litigation ;14 and
'Reed's Adm'x. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794
(1918). (Cause of action arose in Kentucky; suit instituted in state court of
Minnesota and where witnesses would have to be transported 1,000 miles to scene
of trial. State court of Kentucky enjoined proceedings in Minnesota court).
" See, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. Co. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 572,
185 N. W. 218, 220 (1921) "Federal Employer's Liability Act indicates no in-
tent to prohibit an equity court of a state from regulating the conduct of its
citizens when suing under such act in another state by injunction, to prevent
hardship, opression, or fraud where such power existed prior to the act."
10O'Haire v. Burns, 45 Colo. 432, 101 Pac. 755 (1909); Mason v. Harlow,
84 Kan. 277, 114 Pac. 218 (1911); Hawkins v. Ireland, 64 Minn. 339, 67 N. W.
73 (1896); Bigelow v. Old Dominion. Copper Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 457, 71 Atl. 153(1908). Jurisdiction of the equity court is over the person of the equity de-
fendant by reason of domicil within 66e jurisdliction of the court. On the otherhand, some state courts are reluctant in enjoining suits under the Act instituted
in other state courts. Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 292 Il1. App. 457, 11
N. E. (2d) 610 (1937) ; Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 18, 95 So. 385, 388 (1922) ;
Peterson v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 187 Minn. 228, 244 N. W. 823 (1932);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum, 39 N. M. 22, 38 P. (2d) 1106 (1934).
1136 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. 379 (1928). Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 62 S. Ct. 139, 86 L. ed. 107 (1941). See also Wells Fargo & Co.
v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 41 S. Ct. 93, 65 L. ed. 205 (1920). While these deci-
sions indicate that there are some exceptions to the anti-injunction rule, none of
the exceptions seem to apply to the situation here under discussion. This is true
even if it be assumed that the Toucey case has not narrowed the exceptions as-
serted to exist by the opinion in the Wells Fargo case.2Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
McConnell v. Thompson, 212 Ind. 161, 8 N. E. (2d) 986 (1937) affd in
213 Ind. 16, 11 N. E. (2d) 183 (1937). (Accident occurred in Indiana, residence
of deceased employee, where all the railroad's witnesses were available. Adm'r.
of deceased instituted suit in federal court of Missouri. Railroad then sought
injunction in Indiana state court to enjoin federal suit in Missouri. Held: In-junction denied.)
" Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326, (C. C. A. 8th, 1923)(an Iowa statute designed to prohibit a so-called practice of "ambulance chasing"
was declared unconstitutional as interfering with a citizen's right under the
federal act to bring his suit in a foreign court. The statute had stated that all
actions for injuries arising within the state must be instituted in Iowa courts).
Cf. Rader v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 108 Fed. (2d) 980, (C. C. A. 7th,
1940) (where Illinois federal court refused to recognize supplemental order of
Ohio state court since it had acquired jurisdiction at time of supplemental order).
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burdening interstate commerce. 15 The reluctance of the state courts
to enjoin employee's foreign federal suit is based on a fear that granting
such injunction would constitute interference with the jurisdiction of
federal courts and with the federal right of the employee under the Act
in question.: 6 As to suits instituted in federal courts to enjoin suits
under the Act brought in other federal courts, the injunction is usually
denied on the ground that the employee cannot be enjoined from suing
in any federal court in which he is expressly authorized to bring action
by federal statute.' 7
The majority opinion in the instant case clearly means that a state
court has no power to enjoin actions instituted in foreign federal courts
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act if the Act's venue provi-
sions are satisfied. However, the reasoning adopted by the court con-
tains much broader implications. Every argument used in the opinion
is available to sustain the conclusion that, under similar circumstances,
a state court has no authority to enjoin proceedings under the Act in-
stituted in foreign state courts. This is true since the right to sue in
such foreign state court seems to have become a federal right (because
expressly provided by the Act) to the same extent as the right to sue
in a foreign federal court. And it would seem to be immaterial whether
injunction be sought in a state or federal court. Consequently, the
situation seems to be that no injunction may issue, in any case, to pre-
vent bringing of the action in any court, state or federal, authorized to
take jurisdiction under the Act. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter puts this interpretation on the majority opinion' 8 (though,
as seen above, proceedings under the Act in foreign state courts have
commonly been enjoined).'" If this is the proper construction of the
Act, it merits no criticism for placing foreign state and foreign federal
actions on the same basis. Under any other construction, even where
state proceedings could be enjoined, a clever attorney seeking to harass
the railroad with a distant suit could always find an injunction-free
haven in federal courts.2 0  Therefore, to permit the enjoining of state
proceedings would be important only in denying access to foreign state
judges or jurors known to be unfavorable to railroads.
Thus the Supreme Court apparently declared the venue clause of
the Act to mean that every litigant under that act receives a federal
11 Schendel v. McGee, 300 Fed. 273, 278 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Connelly v.
Central R. Co. of N. J., 238 Fed. 932 (D. C. New York, 1916).11 McConnell v. Thompson, 213 Ind. 16 at 29, 8 N. E. (2d) 986 at 991 (1937).
See Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
"7Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Vigor, 90 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937);
Southern R. Co. v. Cochran, 56 F. (2d) 1019, 1020. (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).8 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 62 S. Ct. 6, 14, 86 L. ed. Adv. Ops.
37, 45 (1941). 10 Supra note 6, 7, 8, and 9.
" See the history of the litigation in Rader v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co.,
108 Fed. (2d) 980, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
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right to originate action in any one of the three designated jurisdictions,
free from collateral interference and regardless of contravening equi-
ties. However, an equitable construction of the venue clause, as inter-
preted by Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, would warrant no
such finding; for to forbid the granting of injunction in all cases leaves
an-undesirable situation since the courts are left utterly powerless to
give the relief ordinarily granted by courts of equity. Thus it seems
that the more equitable solution would be to permit injunction not only
where the foreign suit is in a state court, but also where it is in a fed-
eral court. And the power to enjoin should be exercisable by either a
state or federal court, though the latter, in so far as it contemplates in-
junction against state action, would probably require amendment of the
general federal anti-injunction statute. Admittedly, the Congressional
purpose was to give the injured employee every possible opportunity to
institute suit in a court convenient to both witnesses and parties.21
However, it can hardly be supposed that Congress, by giving the em-
ployee this privilege, intended for it to be used as a sword to harass
the railroad into an inequitable settlement outside of court. Therefore,
it seems that this privilege should be subordinated to the right and duty
of the court to change the venue where the convenience of witnesses
and the ends of justice would be promoted thereby.22 And thus, if an
employee has in good faith brought a suit in a location reasonably con-
venient to him, even though somewhat inconvenient to the railroad, the
obvious intention of the Act would prohibit injunction. On the other
hand, where the injured employee institutes suit in a forum distant
from his home and the scene of the accident, for no other apparent
reason than to harass the railroad or to obtain a larger verdict or a more
favorable judge, injunction should issue. Allowing state courts to en-
join such foreign federal actions, while taking no substantive right from
the injured employee, would avoid the heretofore anomalous situation
of enjoining distant state suits but allowing similarly unreasonable and
burdensome federal actions to go on unhindered. The fact that there
is no express Congressional prohibition of this equitable practice is a
weighty factor in favor of its use.
But should the federal courts continue to frown upon this injunc-
tive power, another solution may be suggested. It seems that the Act
could be construed as giving the federal courts discretion to dismiss
burdensome suits under a plea of forum non conveniens,23 similar to
21 Connelly v. Central R. Co., 238 Fed. 932 (D. C. N. Y., 1916); Trapp v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. 283 Fed. 655 (D. C. Ohio 1922).
22 State ex rel. Warren v. Dist. Co. of Mannomen County, 156 Minn. 394, 400,
194 N. W. 876, 879 (1923).
"3 Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law
(1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 1, 34.
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that which operates at civil law, instead of as creating mandatory juris-
diction.2 4  It has been held by the Supreme Court itself that when a
foreign state court in its discretion declines jurisdiction as a forum non
conveniens, the employee is not denied a federal right under the stat-
ute.25  Therefore, it should follow that a foreign federal court could,
at its discretion, dismiss suit without denying a federal right. 26 Such
an hypothesis seems logical since the statute, in terms, draws no dis-
Oinction between state court and federal court jurisdiction. While pos-
sibly containing some contrary implications, the majority opinion in
the instant case does not necessarily prohibit the invocation of the
forum non conveniens doctrine. It does not overrule the prior deci-
sions approving its exercise by state courts; and, under the language of
the Act, it is difficult to see why it could be exercised by state courts
unless it can also be exercised by federal courts. The net effect of the
principal case, if followed by recognition of this doctrine, would be to
shift the discretion to prevent serious injustice from the courts near
the scene to the court selected by the plaintiff as the original forum.27
Another solution to the problem presented in the principal case
would be a redrafting of those provisions of Section 56 set forth above,
Provision (2) would remain unchanged, but a qualification would be
added to the third provision. As that provision now reads, "the ac-
tion may be brought in any district in which the railroads may be doing
business at the time the suit is initiated." The redrafting provision
might provide that upon a showing by the defendant railroad that the
suit was instituted in the particular forum solely for the purpose of
harassing the defendant by forcing him to go to unnecessary expense
and inconvenience in defending the distant suit, no benefit resulting
to the employee, the court may in its discretion grant removal to a
forum which, under all the circumstances, would be most convenient
for all parties. A similar qualification might be added to the first pro-
vision.
Remarkably enough, the authorities are substantially uniform in
support of the result reached, on the particular facts presented, by the
majority opinion in the principal case. It is submitted that-these deci-
24 Southern R. R. Co. v. Cochran, 56 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932);
Schendel v. McGee, 300 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924). These cases apparently
regard the jurisdiction as mandatory.2 2 Douglas v. New Haven R. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377; 49 S. Ct. 355; 73 L. ed.
747 (1929); McConnell v. Thompson, 213 Ind. 16, 11 N. E. (2d) 183 (1937).
"
8 See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U. S. 413, 422, 52 S.
Ct. 413, 76 L. ed. 837, 843 (1932) ; also Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1,
19, 60 S. Ct. 39, 84 L. ed. 3, 10 (1939).
2' Some state courts apparently do not recognize the forum non conveniens
doctrine. See Holim v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 188 Mich. 605, 155 N. W.
504 (1915) and see Mondou v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct.
169, 56 L. ed. 327 (1912). To this extent, unfortunately, apparently no court
would have such discretion.
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sions have, however, undoubtedly defeated the purposes of Congress
by permitting the employee to use his shield as a sword. The instant
decision permits an impractical situation to remain unsolved.
WILLIAM J. RENDLEXAN.
Landlord and Tenant--Statutory Liens on Crops-
Rent Notes-Double Liability of Tenant
T leased farm lands from L for one year at a stipulated cash rental.
Subsequently L gave an agricultural lien to X, a farmers' supply house,
for supplies. The lien described all the lands of L, including those
leased to T. The supplies given to L by X were never received by T
nor used in any way on the lands which he rented. A few days after
L's execution of the crop lien T gave L a negotiable rent note for the
amount of the rental. L assigned the note for value to Y. X, the
holder of the lien, and Y, the holder of the note, both claimed the rent
which T owed. T voluntarily paid Y, but the court found X to be en-
titled to the proceeds of the crop to the amount of the rental.'
After the War Between the States the vital agricultural economy of
the South lay shattered. Many farmers had lost their lands, others
were land-poor, and the farm laboring class, freed negroes, were ig-
norant and irresponsible. To secure those who extended credit needed
for cultivation and so to accelerate the return of agricultural produc-
tion, Southern legislatures provided for the attachment of various stat-
utory liens to crops.2 Two of these statutory liens, the landlord's lien
for rent and advances3 and the agricultural lien for advances, 4 are in-
volved in the instant case.
The landlord's lien statute provides that the crops raised on the land
shall be "vested in possession" of the landlord or his assigns until the
rents are paid and until the stipulations of the lease are performed or
damages paid in lieu thereof, and until the landlord is paid for all
"advancements made and expenses incurred in making and saving said
crops." The statute provides that this lien is to have preference over
all other liens.5
1 Rhodes v. Smith-Douglas Fertilizer Co., 220 N. C. 21, 16 S. E. (2d) 408
(1941).
2 The North Carolina agricultural lien was created in 1867. N. C. Pub. Laws
1866-67, c. 1. The North Carolina laborer's lien law was passed in 1869 primarily
to protect the rights of freed negroes who were dependent on their manual labor
on the soil. Whitaker v. Smith, 81 N. C. 340 (1879). Later, in 1869, the first
landlord's lien statute was passed. N. C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, c. 156, §§131 14, 15.
This latter statute has been amended frequently, but reached substantially its
present form in 1877. N. C. Pub. Laws 1876-77, c. 283.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2355.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2480.
'The common law remedy of distress has never existed in North Carolina,
and prior to the landlord's lien statute the landlord had no remedy which dif-
fered from that of other creditors of his tenant. Reynolds v. Taylor, 144 N. C.
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Once the relation of landlord and tenant is established the lien at-
taches automatically. 6  Under our statute a tenant and a "cropper"-
one who farms the land for a share of the crop-have the same status as
far as ownership of the crop is concerned,7 constructive possession of
the entire crop being in the landlords but the cultivator having the right
to actual possession for purposes of making and gathering the crop.9
Until his claim is satisfied the landlord may sue for conversion either
the tenant'0 or any purchaser from the tenant who denies his right to
the crop,' and may follow the crop through as many hands as neces-
sary.12 The tenant or anyone who aids him in removing the crop with-
out the landlord's consent and before satisfaction of the landlord's claim
165, 56 S. E. 871 (1907) ; Howland v. Farrar, 108 N. C. 567, 13 S. E. 173 (1891) ;
Deaver v. Rice, 20 N. C. 567 (1839); Dalgleish v. Grandy, 1 N. C. 161 (1800).
On the remedy of distress and its gradual disappearance in the United States,
see Note (1886) 15 Am. Dec. 584.
'Burwell v. Cooper Co-operative Co., 172 N. C. 79, 89 S. E. 1064 (1916);
Ford v. Green, 121 N. C. 70, 28 S. E. 132 (1897) ; Jones v. Jones, 117 N. C. 254,
23 S. E. 214 (1895); Crinkley v. Egerton, 113 N. C. 445, 18 S. E. 669 (1893) ;
Spruill v. Arrington, 109 N. C. 192, 13 S. E. 779 (1891). But cf. Warrington v.
Hardison, 185 N. C. 76, 116 S. E. 166 (1923); Taylor v. Taylor, 112 N. C. 27,
16 S. E. 924 (1893); 1 JONES, LmNS (3rd ed. 1914) §553. Liens created by ex-
press covenant in the lease are not within the scope of this note.
'Alabama has also abolished any distinction between tenant and cropper by
raising the cropper's legal status to that of a tenant. ALA. CoDE ANN. (Michie,
1928) §8807. But in other states where the distinction has not been affected by
statute the cropper is either a tenant in common of the crops with the landlord
(Texas, Tennessee, Mississippi), or the crops belong to the landlord alone sub-
ject to the cropper's lien as a laborer for his share (Arkansas, South Carolina,
Georgia). On the other hand, outside of North Carolina, a tenant, as distinguished
from a cropper, is generally held to be the sole owner of the crop and entitled
to its possession. The provision in our statute that the landlord shall be "vested
in possession" of the crop seems unique as applied to tenants. Book, The Legal
Status of Share-Tenants and Share-Croppers in the South (1937) 4 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 539; Cotton, Regulations of Farm Landlord-Tenant Relation-
ships (1937) 4 LAW & CONTEmP. PRoB. 508; Notes (1913) 46 L. R. A. (N. S.)
53, (1894) 23 L. R. A. 258. For surveys of landlords' statutory liens see 1
JONES, LIENS (3rd ed. 1914) §602 et seq.; Notes (1908) 119 Am. St. Rep. 122,
(1891) 12 L. R. A. 605.
' State v. Austin, 123 N. C. 749, 31 S. E. 731 (1898) (landlord may repel by
force any attempt by tenant or cropper to remove the crop before satisfaction of
the landlord's lien); Boone v. Darden, 109 N. C. 74, 13 S. E. 728 (1891) ; Brewer
v. Chappell, 101 N. C. 251, 7 S. E. 670 (1888). But cf. Tobacco Growers' Co-
operative Ass'n v. Bissett, 187 N. C. 180, 121 S. E. 446 (1924).
' Batts v. Sullivan, 182 N. C. 129, 108 S. E. 511 (1921) (cropper has insur-
able interest in undivided crop). Compare Rich v. Hobson, 112 N. C. 79, 16
S. E. 931 (1893) with Jordan v. Bryan, 103 N. C. 59, 9 S. E. 135 (1889) ; State
v. Copeland, 86 N. C. 692 (1882).
"0 McGehee v. Breedlove, 122 N. C. 277, 30 S. E. 311 (1898) ; Rich v. Hobson,
112 N. C. 79, 16 S. E. 931 (1893); Livingston v. Farish, 89 N. C. 140 (1883).
The original landlord also has a lien on the crops of a subtenant. Never Fail
Land Co. v. Cole, 197 N. C. 452, 149 S. E. 585 (1929); Moore v. Faison, 97
N. C. 322, 2 S. E. 169 (1887); Montague v. Mial, 89 N. C. 137 (1883); Note
(1916) Ann. Cas. 1916E 826.
"
1 McGehee v. Breedlove, 122 N. C. 277, 30 S. E. 311 (1898); Thigpen v.
Maget, 107 N. C. 39, 10 S. E. 272 (1890).
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2355; see Belcher v. Grimsley, 88 N. C.
88, 91 (1883).
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is liable both civilly and criminally. 13 On the other hand it has been
held that the North Carolina landlord's lien relates only to crops, 14
attaches only to crops planted during the year for which the lands are
rented, and secures only the rent for that particular year.15
The landlord's lien for advances is on a parity with his lien for rent
and the above provisions as to rent seem to apply also to advances."0
His aggregate claim for both has priority over all other claims on the
crop.' 7 Evidently the advancements made must be of the same nature
as those which give rise to an agricultural lien. As indicative of legis-
lative intent to this effect there is an express provision in the statute
that the same price limitations shall apply to advancements secured
by landlords' liens as to those secured by agricultural liens.' 8 Supplies
obtained from others on the landlord's credit are considered advance-
ments of the landlord,19 but where the landlord is merely a surety for
the tenant's debt for supplies the advancements are not secured by the
landlord's lien.20 The advancements either of money or supplies must
be made for the purpose of inaking or saving the crop. But the tenant
is the judge of his own needs and the landlord is not required to see
that the supplies are actually used on the land. Anything of value
supplied by the landlord in good faith, directly or indirectly for the
purpose of making or saving the crop could be secured by the land-
lord's lien (or the agricultural lien)21
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2362 (Unlawful seizures by the land-
lord are also prohibited).
" Reynolds v. Taylor, 144 N. C. 165, 56 S. E. 871 (1907); Howland v.
Forlaw, 108 N. C. 567, 13 S. E. 173 (1891).
15 Glover v. Dail, 199 N. C. 659, 155 S. E. 575 (1930) ; Brooks v. Garrett, 195
N. C. 452, 142 S. E. 486 (1928) ; Ballard v. Johnson, 114 N. C. 141, 19 S. E. 98
(1894) ; Slaughter v. Winfrey, 85 N. C. 159 (1881) (landlord's lien includes cost
of legal action necessary to recover rent) ; Notes (1935) 96 A. L. R. 249, (1920)
9 A. L. 1? 300.
" Brooks v. Garrett, 195 N. C. 452, 142 S. E. 486 (1928).
" Brooks v. Garrett, 195 N. C. 452, 142 S. E. 486 (1928). In some states the
landlord's lien for rent is prior to all others but his lien for advances is limited
to the same status as that of others who extend advances to the tenant. S. C.
CODE (1932) §8771.
18 The landlord, or other persons advancing agricultural supplies, may not
charge more than 10% over the retail cash price for such supplies, and the
10% shall be in lieu of interest on the debt. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)§2482.
"' Ransom v. Eastern Cotton Oil Co., 203 N. C. 193, 165 S. E. 350 (1932);
Powell v. Perry, 127 N. C. 22, 37 S. E. 71 (1900).
2Kafman v. Underwood, 83 Ark. 118, 1002 S. W. 718 (1907); Swann v.
Morris, 83 Ga. 143, 9 S. E. 767 (1889). Note (1908) 119 Am. St. Rep. 121, 130.
2 Some things, such as guano, seed, farm implements, subsistence for farm
animals, and the like are per se advances which are presumed to have been given
for the purpose of making the crop. Windsor Bargain House v. Watson, 148
N. C. 295, 62 S. E. 305 (1908); Brown v. Brown, 109 N. C. 124, 13 S. E. 797
(1891) ; Thigpen v. Maget, 107 N. C. 39, 10 S. E. 272 (1890) ; Womble v. Leach,
83 N. C. 84 (1880). But cf. Branch v. Galloway, 105 N. C. 193, 10 S. E. 911
(1890). This is likewise true of the extension of subsistence to the tenant, or
board for the tenant and his wife at the landlord's table. Brown v. Brown, 109
N. C. 124, 13 S. E. 797 (1891). Where the supplies advanced are not in them-
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An additional type of security established by statute in North Caro-
lina is the agricultural lien, as distinguished from the landlord's lien
for rent and/or advances. This claim may be secured by anyone who
extends money or supplies to be expended in the cultivation of a crop.
The leading case in this state, Clark v. Farrar,2 2 sets up five requisites
for a valid agricultural lien. The advancements must be (1) money or
supplies ;23 (2) made to the persons engaged, or about to engage in the
cultivation of the soil ;24 (3) made after the lien agreement ;25 (4) made
to be expended in cultivation of the crop during that year;26 and (5)
the lien must be on the crop of that year, made by reason of the ad-
vances so given.27 Though the statute provides that the lien is to be
written and registered, this provision is for the protection of creditors,
subsequent purchasers, and other third parties, and has no effect on
the validity of the claim as between the lienor and lienee.28 No par-
ticular form is required, but rather the existence of an agricultural lien
depends on the intention of the parties. 29 Agricultural liens may apply
to all crops planted within a year of the date of the advances regard-
less of the number of crops planted during the year.30 The courts'
require that the lands on which the crop is to be grown must be so
definitely described as to be capable of present ascertainment.3 ' By
statute, this type of claim is made superior to all others against the crop
except the landlord's and laborer's liens.
selves agricultural in nature, such as snuff, calico, homespun, velvet, kerosene,
shoes, soap, salt, thread, buttons, tobacco, coffee, cakes, and candy, it must be
shown affirmatively that they were extended for the purpose of aiding, no matter
how indirectly, the tenant to make and gather his crop. Nichols v. Speller, 120
N. C. 75, 26 S. E. 632 (1897); Brown v. Brown, 109 N. C. 124, 13 S. E. 797
(1891) ; Ledbetter v. Quick, 90 N. C. 276 (1884). As a practical matter, under
the paternalistic system of share-cropping which prevails throughout the South,
the landlord often supplies nearly all the tenant's physical needs from birth to
burial. Vance, Human Factors in the South's Agricultural Readjustment (1934)
1 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoD. 259.
.2 74 N. C. 686 (1876). "2 See note 21 supra.
" Womble v. Leach, 83 N. C. 84 (1880) (advances made to cultivator's
order).2 Lowdermilk v. Bostick, 98 N. C. 299, 3 S. E. 844 (1887); Patapsco v.
Magee, 86 N. C. 350 (1882). But cf. Reese v. Cole, 93 N. C. 87 (1885).
2' See note 21 supra.
27Loftin v. Hines, 107 N. C. 360, 12 S. E. 197 (1890) (liens for a second or
greater number of years are void because of public policy); Wooten v. Hill,
98 N. C. 48, 3 S. E. 846 (1887).
28 Odom v. Clark, 146 N. C. 544, 60 S. E. 513 (1908) ; Reese v. Cole, 93 N. C.
87 (1885); Gay v. Nash, 78 N. C. 100 (1878).
"Jones-Phillips Co. v. McCormick, 174 N. C. 82, 93 S. E. 449 (1917);
Meekins v. Walker, 119 N. C. 46, 25 S. E. 706 (1896) ; Townsend v. McKinnon,
98 N. C. 103, 3 S. E. 836 (1887) ; Rawlings v. Hunt, 90 N. C. 270 (1884) (the
same instrument may operate as an agricultural lien and as a chattel mortgage).
" Legis. (1926) 4 N. C. L. Rv. 4.
"1 Crinkley v. Egerton, 113 N. C. 142, 18 S. E. 341 (1893) ; Perry v. Bragg,
109 N. C. 303, 14 S. E. 97 (1891); Weil v. Flowers, 109 N. C. 212, 13 S. E.
761 (1891); Gwathney v. Etheridge, 99 N. C. 571, 6 S. E. 411 (1888).
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In the instant case the landlord automatically obtained a landlord's
lien by virtue of his status. When he executed the agricultural lien to
X he thereby assigned his landlord's lien as additional security. There-
fore the crop is subject'to the claim of X to the extent of the landlord's
lien. But the tenant would also be liable on the personal obligation
in the form of the negotiable note which he gave L, since Y is a holder
in due course for value.3 2 Thus, while the claim of X is preferred to
that of Y, T must pay both..
The tenant farmer who executes a rent note is subjected to this
risk of unjust double liability by the action of the landlord in assigning
his lien and the rent note to separate third parties.33 Where such sepa-
rate assignments are made, there are three possible situations: (1) The
note might be assigned before the assignment of the landlord's lien.
In such a case the lien would follow the note ;34 and therefore it would
seem that any subsequent attempted assignment of the landlord's lien,
by creation of an agricultural lien or otherwise, would be ineffective-
the tenant would be liable only to the holder of the note. (2) The note
might be received by the landlord before any assignment but not as-
signed until after the assignment of the landlord's lien. (3') The rent
note might be both received and assigned by the landlord subsequent
to his assignment of his landlord's lien. This latter situation is the
instant case.
Under the law as it now stands it seems that the tenant would be
subjected to double liability for rent in the last two cases. 3 5 Allowing
the landlord to control the tenant's liability through merely shifting the
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§3033, 3038; Standing Stone Nat. Bank
v. Walser, 162 N. C. 53, 77 S. E. 1006 (1913).83For discussion of a somewhat analogous situation see Ross, The Double
Hazard of a Note and Mortgage (1932) 16 MINN. L. Rr.v. 123.
"Wise Supply Co. v. Davis, 194 N. C. 328, 139 S. E. 599 (1927) ; Avera v.
McNeill, 77 N. C. 50 (1877); Lee v. Spence, 5 Tenn. App. 363 (1927); 2
WILLISTON, CoNTaAcTs (rev. ed. 1936) §§432, 447A.
" It might be argued that the assignee of the landlord's lien should take it
subject to any existing defenses which the tenant might have against the land-
lord. This doctrine applies to assignments of debts and choses in action. 2
WILLISTON, CONRAcrs (rev. ed. 1936) §432. Due to the nature of the North
Carolina landlord's lien its assignment is more in the nature of a transfer of a
property right than the assignment of a chose in action, and therefore it is be-
lieved that such an argument would be rejected. Furthermore, even this argu-
ment would not prevent double liability in the instant case where the landlord's
lien was transferred through execution of an agricultural lien which was re-
corded before the tenant executed his rent note. This recordation probably gave
constructive notice of the assignment to the tenant iN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1939) §2480 (agricultural liens must be registered) ; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1939) §3311; Blalock v. Strain, 122 N. C. 283, 29 S. E. 408 (1898) (where the
recording act applies constructive notice is all important and actual notice is
immaterial). But see 2 WILLISTON, CONTARCrs (rev. ed. 1936) §437 (in general
actual notice is necessary). As to whether the recordation statute applies to
agricultural liens for this purpose, queret], and the rights of the assignee could
not he defeated by any subsequent defense which might arise against the land-
lord. 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs (rev. ed. 1936) §433.
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order of his assignments, obviously places an undesirable risk on the
tenant, as is shown by the result of the instant decision. The possibility
that after expensive litigation the tenant might obtain a judgment against
the landlord is no solution.
In situation (2), double liability would be prevented by ruling that
when the landlord accepted the rent note the lien attached to the note
itself as additional security for its payment. The ultimate holder of the
note would then be also the holder of the lien and the tenant would not
be liable to anyone else. The separate assignee of the landlord's lien
would take at his peril under the doctrine of caveat emptor.36 The
same result could be reached by holding that the landlord's lien was
lost by waiver when the note was accepted, but such a holding is con-
trary to the weight of authority.37 By holding that the lien attached to
the note the landlord's security would be preserved and the tenant
would also be freed from risk of double liability.
Such a solution of course would be of no avail in the third situation
above (the instant case), for there the statutory lien is assigned before
the acceptance of the note and consequently before any attachment
could occur. The rights of the first assignee should not be impaired
by any subsequent action of the landlord or tenant.38  Nor should the
tenant escape his personal liability to the holder in due course of his
negotiable paper.39 It is believed that the only adequate solution to the
difficulty is through statutory revision. A statutory proviso that the
landlord's lien may not be assigned without the service of written notice
on the tenant would be socially beneficial. The tenant would thus re-
ceive actual notice of any attempted assignment and would be on his
guard against any subsequent execution of a note. Many claims and
liens which arise by implication of law are already non-assignable,
either because of the personal relation of the parties or for reasons of
public policy.40 There seems no valid objection to qualifying in the
manner suggested the lien given to the agricultural landlord.
Though the result of the instant case may have been inescapable, the
language of the decision is unfortunate. By failing to point out the
clear-cut distinction between the landlord's lien and the agricultural lien
the court leaves the law somewhat confused. In the instant fact, situa-
tion, the assignment of the landlord's lien on the tenant's crop was
'0 Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 271, 274, 21 L. ed. 313, 315 (1872)
(mortgage held to attach to note so that an assignment of the note carried the
mortgage with it, while assignment of the latter alone was a nullity). But the
cases are divided as to whether a mortgage attaches to a note. See Ross, The
Double Hazard of a Note and Mortgage (1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 123.
" 1 JONES, LIENS (3rd ed., 1914) §585.
08 See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS (rev. ed. 1936) §433; note 35 supra.
a' See note 32 supra.402 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §§405, 411, 411A, 417.
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made automatically as additional security for an agricultural lien cover-
ing all the lands of the landlord. The supplies given to the landlord by
the lienor were never received by the tenant or used on his land. This
of course would not be necessary to the validity of an assignment of
the landlord's lien,-the landlord-assignor having received his consid-
eration for the assignment and being under no obligation to turn it over
to anyone else. However, the decision seems to imply that the landlord
has the further power to execute a valid agricultural lien on the tenant's
crop without turning over any of the supplies to the tenant. No case
has been found to justify such a conclusion. True, many cases say
that the lienor is not required to see that the supplies are used on the
land, and that his rights are not defeated if the supplies are diverted to
another purpose by the lienee. 41 But in all such cases the supplies were
extended to the cultivator of the soil, or to his order. Indeed, Clark v.
Farrar (recognized as a sound decision in the instant case) sets up the
rule that the supplies must be extended to the "persons engaged, or
about to engage in the cultivation of the soil." This clearly seems to
preclude the landlord from executing a lien on the crops grown on the
lands of a tenant.42  To hold otherwise would allow the landlord to
encumber the crops without even the actual knowledge of the tenant.
It should not be necessary for the tenant continually to resort to the
courthouse to see if a lien has been recorded on his crop. The court in
the instant decision says, "The risk that the landlord might create a
lien upon the crops to be raised by Sherrod [the tenant], which has
been so unfortunate for him, was assumed by him when he entered into
his contract of rental."43  The landlord's lien is conferred by statute.
While by statute it may be assigned, the landlord should have no power
to "create" any other lien on the crop beyond the landlord's interest,-
and that is covered by the landlord's lien. The implication in the instant
case, if intended by the court, is regrettable. It seems unjust to compel
the tenant to assume the risk of any such additional lien.
The social and economic degradation of the modern Southern farm
tenant is notorious. Often illiterate, and usually forced by the most
1Nichols v. Speller, 120 N. C. 75, 26 S. E. 632 (1897); Womble v. Leach,
83 N. C. 84 (1880) ; Brown v. Brown, 109 N. C. 124, 13 S. E. 797 (1891) (land-
lord's lien) ; Ledbetter v. Quick, 90 N. C. 276 (1884) (landlord's lien) ; see
Collins v. Bass, 198 N. C. 99, 103, 150 S. E. 706, 708 (1929).
42 In Australia the prospective lienor has the burden of seeing that the sup-
plies are extended to the person actually working on the land. Advancements
made to the owner or lessee legally entitled to possession are not sufficient. Note(1939) 13 AusT. L. J. 270.
"In support of this statement the court cites two cases which hold that one
who takes an agricultural lien from a tenant assumes the risk that the tenant
will not satisfy the landlord's lien or will abandon the crop and so forfeit his
share. In both of these cases it is the person who deals with the tenant of an-
other, and not the tenant himself, who assumes the risk of loss. Thigpen v.
Maget, 107 N. C. 39, 10 S. E. 272 (1890); Thigpen v. Leigh, 93 N. C. 47 (1885).
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stringent economic necessity to labor on the land, his pitiful condition
retards not only his own development but also that of the society in
which he lives.44 Under the interpretation of the instant case, the stat-
utory liens which were granted to succor agriculture, place excessive
power in the hands of the unscrupulous landlord. Because of the ob-
vious inequality in bargaining power between the landlord and the farm
tenant it is believed that social policy demands more adequate legal
protection of the rights of the tenant, with proportionate restrictions
on the power of the landlord. Therefore it is submitted: 1. that the
instant case should not be followed in so far as it implies that the land-
lord may execute an agricultural lien on crops grown by the tenant;
and 2. that the North Carolina Landlord's Lien statute should be amend-
ed to prohibit any assignment of the lien without the service of writ-
ten notice on the tenant.
JoHN T. KILPATRICK, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Extension of Boundaries--
Separability of Unconstitutional Statutory Provisions
Chapter 463 of the Public Local Laws of 1941 provided for an ex-
tension of the corporate limits of the City of Raleigh, subject to ap-
proval by the combined ballot of the voters of Raleigh and of the ter-
ritory to be annexed. Section 4 of this act states that upon a majority
vote for extension, the territory shall be annexed on January 1, 1942;
providing further that, if the annexed territory does not receive the
same services and privileges, within the- two years succeeding its in-
corporation, as shall be afforded similar properties now within the city
limits, this annexed territory shall be exempt from taxation by the City
of Raleigh until such services are extended to the territory to be an-
nexed. In a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the validity
of Chapter 463, a divided North Carolina Supreme Court declared the
taxation proviso in Section 4 to be unconstitutional, but upheld the re-
mainder of the act as valid and separable.'
The present statute differs from the more common form of exten-
sion act in that certain conditions precedent to its taking effect are set
up by the legislature, whereas the usual act is a mere legislative declara-
tion of extension (19 out of 21 extension acts passed in 1941 being of
the latter type).2 In spite of this usual practice, however, the cases
"' ODUM, SOUTHERN REGIONS (1st ed. 1936) 486, 489; Symposium on Agri-
cultural Readjustment in the South (June, 1934) 1 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 259-
291, 390-397; Symposium on Farm Tenancy (October, 1937) 4 LAw & CoNTEmP.
PROB. 424-572; Note (1937) 25 GRo. L. J. 387.
'Banks v. Raleigh, 220 N. C. 35, 16 S. E. (2d) 413 (1941).
'Brief of Raleigh Junior Chamber of Commerce. Amicus Curiae, p. II,
Banks v. Raleigh, 220 N. C. 35, 16 S. E. (2d) 413 (1941).
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indicate that the legislature of the State is free to impose almost any
condition precedent to the taking effect of the act,3 provisions having
been sanctioned requiring submission of the act (1) to the combined
voters of both city and the territory to be annexed,4 (2) to the voters
of the city,5 (3) to the voters of the territory,6 and (4) to the approval
of the mayor and city commissioners. 7 The court has further held
that the legislature may annex even where annexation is expressly op-
posed and disapproved of by the majority of the citizens of the territory
to be annexed.8 Thus, the condition precedent contained in the instant
act is clearly within the traditional practice of the Legislature and con-
forms to the long-standing decisions of the court.
The Supreme Court, however, on authority of Anderson v. City of
Asheville,9 declared invalid the provision making the power of the City
of Raleigh to tax, within the limits covered by the extension, dependent
upon the type of service rendered. In rendering this decision, however,
the court did not call attention to the new constitutional provision for
classification of taxes10 adopted since the case of Anderson v. City of
Asheville." But the result reached by the court raises many interest-
ing questions, which unfortunately the court did not discuss: (1) is
this provision in fact a classification or an exemption; (2) if a classifi-
cation, does the new constitutional provision permit a classification
based on location of the property; and (3) if an exemption, just how
far may the legislature go in exempting property in view of the fact
that apparently taxes need no longer be based upon the true value of
the land taxed. Furthermore, even with an unfavorable determina-
tion of these problems, it is at least arguable that, since the legislature
'Dunn v. Tew, 219 N. C. 286, 13 S. E. (2d) 536 (1941); Highlands v. Hick-
ory, 202 N. C. 167, 162 S. E. 471 (1931); McGraw v. Merryman, 133 Md. 247,
104 Atl. 540 (1918) ; Groff v. Frederick City, 44 Md. 67 (1876).
" Lutterloh v. Fayetteville, 149 N. C. 65, 62 S. E. 758 (1908); LAWS OF
N. C., PRIVATE LAWS OF 1925, c. 105 (Edenton); LAWS OF N. C., PRIVATE LAWS
OF 1925, c. 21 (Fayetteville).
State v. Westport, 116 Mo. 582, 22 S. W. 888 (1893).0 Watson v. Commissioners, 82 N. C. 17 (1880); LAWS OF N. C., PuBxac
LAWS OF 1873-74, c. 152 (allow township in Beaufort to vote on question of
annexation to Pamlico county).
7 Manly v. Raleigh, 57 N. C. 370 (1859).8 Dunn v. Tew, 219 N. C. 286, 13 S. E. (2d) 563 (1941) ; Highlands v. Hick-
ory, 202 N. C. 167, 162 S. E. 471 (1931); Lutteroh v. Fayetteville, 149 N. C.
65, 62 S. E. 758 (1908) ; Manly v. Raleigh, 57 N. C. 370 (1859).
'Anderson v. Asheville, 194 N. C. 117, 138 S. E. 715 (1927).
'I N. C. CoNsT. ART. V, §3: "The power of taxation shall be exercised in a
just and equitable manner ahd shall never be surrendered, suspended, or con-
tracted away. Taxes on property shall be uniform as to each class of property
taxed. Taxes shall be levied only for public purposes and every act levying a
tax shall state the object to which it is applied." (This section replaces the old
ART. VII, §9.)
21 N. C. CoNsT. ART. VII, §9: "All taxes levied by any county, city, or town-
ship shall be uniform and ad valorem on all property in the same, except property
exempted by this Constitution." (This provision has since been stricken from
the Constitution of N. C.)
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could have declared the territory automatically out of the city had the
improvements not been granted, 2 they could equally well have enacted
a lesser penalty upon the city by preventing collection of these taxes if
the condition be unperformed.
The question remains, however: what effect does a declaration that
the aforesaid proviso is invalid have upon the constitutionality of the
act as a whole ?
The rule of severability as applied in North Carolina13 has been
well stated by Walker, J., in Commissioners v. Boring:14 "Where a part
of a statute is invalid, the remainder, if valid, will be enforced, pro-
vided it is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accord-
ance with the apparent legislative intent; but if the void clause cannot
be rejected without causing the statute to enact what the Legislature
did not intend, the whole of it must fall."' 5 Obviously this is a mere
application to a particular problem of the general rule that all statutes
must be construed so as to carry out the apparent legislative intent.16
And thus, although a statute is presumed to be valid until its uncon-
stitutionality is clearly shown,lr once any part of an act is declared
invalid the valid remainder will be allowed to survive only "where it is
plain that Congress (i.e., the Legislature) would have enacted the legis-
lation with the unconstitutional provision eliminated."' s
Although as a whole the North Carolina cases on severability ap-
pear to be somewhat conflicting in their application of this rule, 19 the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, where acts containing invalid
tax provisions are in question, the act will not be deemed severable
when the effect of striking out the "offending proviso would result in
enlarging the effect and operation of the body of the law.' 20 And in
Clawell v. Commissioners21 the court held that the unconstitutionality
of an amendment providing for the exclusion of certain towns from the
operation of a Burke County highway improvement statute rendered
1243 C. J. §77 (4) (a).
2' Archer v. Joyner, 173 N. C. 75, 91 S. E. 699 (1917) ; Smith v. Wilkins, 164
N. C. 136, 80 S. E. 168 (1913); Harper v. Commissioners, 133 N. C. 106, 45
S. E. 526 (1903); Riggsbee v. Durham, 94 N. C. 800 (1886).14175 N. C. 105, 95 S. E. 43 (1918).5 Id. at p. 111, 95 S. E. at 46.
1" Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C. 451, 88 S. E. 640 (1916) ; Lowery v. School
Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S. E. 267 (1905); 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImI-
TATIONS (8th ed., 1927) 376.
'1 See Pullen v. Corp. Comm., 152 N. C. 548, 68 S. E. 155 (1910); Blair v.
Coakley, 136 N. C. 405, 48 S. E. 804 (1904).
"See Bank v. Lacy, 188 N. C. 25, 28, 123 S. E. 475, 476 (1924) (quoting
from White, J., in Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 501, 28 S. Ct. 141,
146, 52 L. ed. 297, 310 (1907).
19 17 N. C. DIGEST (Michie, 1937) p. 106, Key 64 of Statutes.
20 See Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C. 451, 458, 88 S. E. 640 (1916); Riggsbee
v. Durham, 94 N. C. 800 (1886).
21 173 N. C. 657, 92 S. E. 481 (1917).
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the entire act invalid, since such a judicial declaration of partial in-
validity would materially alter the scope of the operation of the act as
intended by the Legislature.
On the other hand, where the invalid proviso, rather than limiting
the powers granted in the primary clause of the statute, actually con-
veys an additional power consistent with the legislative purpose of the
entire act, the Court has generally construed the legislative intent to be
to promote the primary purpose of the statute regardless of the fate of
the proviso (particularly when the proviso appears to be merely a
method of assisting this primary purpose).. Thus, in Rodman-Heath v.
Washaw,22 the Supreme Court upheld the provisions of a statute in-
corporating the Town of Waxhaw, while striking out the clause in
that statute permitting said town to pledge its credit for other than
"necessary expenses." Similarly, in Keith v. Lockhart,23 a statute
properly declaring a discontinuance of the stock law in Pender County
was upheld although certain provisions of this statute (setting up a
special tax for erecting a fence around the county) were declared in-
valid. '
There are apparently no cases in North Carolina which have upheld
as valid the primary clause of a statute on which a subordinate and in-
valid clause works a limitation. And if any rule is to be derived from
the cases discussed it is that: Wherever an unconstitutional provision
in an otherwise valid statute operates as a substantial limitation upon
the operation of the remainder of the act, the unconstitutionality of the
proviso permeates the entire act, rendering it totally invalid.2 4 For it
cannot be presumed that the Legislature would have passed the act
without the limitation; and the primary and subordinate clauses are
necessarily and by definition interdependent and disseverable.
The proviso in the instant case is apparently intended to work a
limitation upon the power of the City of Raleigh to tax properties over
which by the operation of the annexation clause it would otherwise ob-
tain complete taxing power. Removing this limitation obviously in-
creases the scope and effect of the act (recognizing a municipal power
denied by the proviso), and seems to place the questioned statute within
the very terms of the decisions in Claywell v. Commissioners25 and
Keith v. Lockhart.26
It is regrettable that the Supreme Court did not discuss the effect
that the instant decision is intended to have upon this doctrine. Instead
the majority of the Court merely declared the proviso to be unconstitu-
22 130 N. C. 293, 41 S. E. 488 (1902).
21 171 N. C. 451, 88 S. E. 640 (1916).
2
' Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C. 451, 88 S. E. 640 (1916).2r 173 N. C. 657, 92 S. E. 481 (1917).
20171 N. C. 451, 88 S. E. 640 (1916).
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tional, to be only incidental and subordinate to the primary clause
providing for annexation, and to be "divisible and separable from the
remainder of the statute."
If this decision was the result of a justified conclusion that the
legislature "would have enacted the legislation with the unconstitu-
tional provision eliminated, '27 then the result is desirable, and the
"scope and effect" doctrine heretofore applied by the Court should
yield to the doctrines of "primary purpose" and "controlling legislative
intent."
It is submitted, however, that such a conclusion is hardly possible
without looking beyond the face of the annexation statute. And this
may account for the split in the court and the barely audible minority
opinion that "the presumption of inseparability should prevail and the
entire act be declared void."
2 8
JAMES BoYcE GARLAND.
2 Bank v. Lacy, 188 N. C. 25, 28, 123 S. E. 475 (1924).
"Banks v. City of Raleigh, 220 N. C. 35, 16 S. E. (2d) 413 (1941). In
writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Stacy indicated that the majority of the
Court deemed the statute severable, whereas the minority considered it insep-
arable, "the diversity of opinion [arising] over a different conception of the
significance to be ascribed to the unconstitutional provision in section 4 of the
Act and the effect of its elision." At no place on the record do the names of the
Justices supporting either of the two conflicting opinions appear. Fortunately,
this procedure, if not unique, is quite unusual in North Carolina.
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